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I. INTRODUCTION
One rarely thinks of civil procedure issues when contemplating the hot topics in
front of the U.S. Supreme Court. However, the Roberts Court put civil procedure
1
back on the map by planting some long-overlooked issues on its docket. In

*
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particular, the Court granted certiorari to resolve two jurisdiction-related questions
over the course of its 2009 and 2010 terms: where is a corporation’s “principal place
of business” located for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction, and when
may a court exercise general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporate
2
defendant? After decades of silence on these issues, the Court resolved each
question with a unanimous opinion. During its 2009 term, the Court ruled in Hertz
3
Corp. v. Friend that a corporation’s principal place of business is its “nerve
center”—i.e., “the place where a corporation’s officers direct, control, and coordinate
4
the corporation’s activities.” At the end of its 2010 term, the Court ruled in
5
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown that a court may assert general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation only when the defendant’s “affiliations with
the State are so ‘continuous and systematic’ as to render [the defendant] essentially at
6
home in the forum State.”
While the Court in Hertz made it very clear which contacts matter for
purposes of determining a corporation’s principal place of business, many
scholars and practitioners have suggested that Goodyear leaves a bit to be desired
in terms of articulating how many or what types of contacts result in a foreign
7
corporation being “essentially at home” in a given forum. However, while
diversity of citizenship subject matter jurisdiction and general personal
jurisdiction are two fundamentally different concepts (the former relates to a
8
court’s ability to adjudicate the particular case before it, while the latter relates

would like to thank Professor Bradley G. Clary for his advice and feedback on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. See Howard M. Wasserman, The Roberts Court and the Civil Procedure Revival, 31 REV. LITIG. 313,
314–15 (2012) (noting that “the Roberts Court is newly engaged in an unexpected area—civil procedure” and
“has heard and decided more than twenty cases in core civil procedure areas, including pleading, summary
judgment, relation back of amended pleadings, personal jurisdiction, federal question jurisdiction, diversity
jurisdiction, jurisdictionality, removal procedure, class actions, civil representation, arbitration of civil and civil
rights claims in lieu of litigation, appealability, remedies, and the Erie-Hanna doctrine”).
2. See id. at 316–17 (noting that the Court’s October 2009 term decision regarding the meaning of
“principal place of business” under the diversity jurisdiction statute marked the first time the Court had
addressed the issue since the statute was enacted in 1958 and that the Court’s October 2010 term decisions
regarding personal jurisdiction were the first on that topic in over two decades).
3. 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
4. Id. at 1192.
5. 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
6. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)).
7. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of “Essentially at Home” in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV.
527, 533 (2012) [hereinafter Stein, Meaning] (“Assuming that the Court intends to permit the exercise of
general jurisdiction over out-of-state corporations only when they are ‘essentially at home’ in the forum, courts
must flesh out what that means. What are the attributes of being ‘at home’ that justify jurisdiction? And what is
the meaning of ‘essentially’? Presumably, that is something short of ‘actually’ being at home, but how short?”);
Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Casa Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and General Jurisdiction over Foreign
Corporations After Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. REV. 697, 698 (2012)
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (“[T]he Court . . . failed to define, for future cases, what it meant by
‘essentially at home,’ a phrase it has used in no other context.”).
8. See infra note 90 and accompanying text.

866

_02_BLANCHARD_FINAL.DOC (DO NOT DELETE)

1/31/2014 9:39 AM

McGeorge Law Review / Vol. 44
9

to a court’s ability to bind a particular defendant by its ruling ), they are linked in
that the goal of both inquiries is to find the geographic location where the
defendant’s contacts are the most significant. Moreover, the analyses raise
similar concerns of fairness, efficiency, and predictability. Thus, although
Goodyear—standing alone—may be somewhat vague, it gains meaning when
read in conjunction with Hertz.
Part II of this Article summarizes the history of general jurisdiction, the
Court’s decision in Goodyear, and the proposed interpretations of the new
10
“essentially at home” test. Part III provides a general overview of the history of
diversity jurisdiction, the Court’s decision in Hertz, and the current “principal
11
place of business” test. Lastly, Part IV argues that the “essentially at home” test
in Goodyear should be given meaning by strictly adhering to the Court’s
12
language and precedent, including its earlier opinion in Hertz. In doing so, Part
IV demonstrates how the two opinions can—and should—be reconciled: Courts
should find a corporation to be “at home” only in the state where it is
incorporated and in the state where its “nerve center” is located. If the
corporation’s headquarters is located outside of the United States, the court
should determine whether the corporation has comparable administrative and
executive contacts in any one location within the United States such that it is
“essentially at home” in that location.
II. GOODYEAR AND THE “ESSENTIALLY AT HOME” TEST:
WHAT DOES IT MEAN?
“Personal jurisdiction” is a fundamental concept for every litigator.
Essentially, it provides a court with the power to subject a defendant to the
13
court’s adjudicative process and to render a binding judgment. A court may
exercise two types of personal jurisdiction over a given defendant: specific or
general. Specific jurisdiction provides the ability to hale the defendant into court
in a particular forum because the cause of action arose from the defendant’s
9. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part II.
11. See infra Part III.
12. See infra Part IV.
13. See, e.g., Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal Jurisdiction
Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach
to Minimum Contacts, 57 BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 136–37 (2005) [hereinafter Rhodes, Predictability Principle];
S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of
Personal Jurisdiction, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 547, 552 (2011) (citing FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL.,
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 2.3, at 60 (5th ed. 2001)) (“The basic premise of the personal jurisdiction doctrine requires
that a court have the necessary authority to engage in binding adjudication over a person.”); Kulko v. Superior
Court, 436 U.S. 84, 91 (1978) (“‘It has long been the rule that a valid judgment imposing a personal obligation
or duty in favor of the plaintiff may be entered only by a court having jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant.’”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “personal jurisdiction” as “[a] court’s
power to bring a person [including a corporation] into its adjudicative process”).
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minimum contacts with that forum. General jurisdiction provides the ability to
hale the defendant into court in a particular forum based on the defendant’s
substantial contacts with that forum, even though the claim at issue is unrelated
15
to the forum or those contacts.
The rules for determining whether a court’s exercise of specific or general
16
jurisdiction is appropriate remained virtually unchanged for decades. Then, on
June 27, 2011, the U.S. Supreme Court handed down two significant opinions: J.
17
McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro and Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown. In McIntyre, a fractured Court discussed the limits on the exercise
of specific jurisdiction over a foreign corporate defendant whose products have
reached the forum—and caused injury therein—through the stream of
18
commerce. In Goodyear, a unanimous Court expounded upon the test for
determining when a court may assert general jurisdiction over a foreign corporate

14. Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984) (“It has been said
that when a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in a suit arising out of or related to the
defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State is exercising ‘specific jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”)
(citations omitted); Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966) (“[A]ffiliations between the forum and the underlying
controversy normally support only the power to adjudicate with respect to issues deriving from, or connected
with, the very controversy that establishes jurisdiction to adjudicate. This we call specific jurisdiction.”); Megan
M. La Belle, The Future of Internet-Related Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown and
J. McIntyre v. Nicastro, 15 J. INTERNET L. 3, 4 (2012) (“Specific jurisdiction . . . requires less pervasive contacts
between the defendant and the forum state. Under this doctrine, . . . courts are only permitted to exercise
jurisdiction over a defendant if the lawsuit arises out of—or is related to—the defendant’s contacts with the
forum.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “specific jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction that
stems from the defendant’s having certain minimum contacts with the forum state so that the court may hear a
case whose issues arise from those minimum contacts”).
15. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415 n.9 (“When a State exercises personal jurisdiction over a defendant in
a suit not arising out of or related to the defendant’s contacts with the forum, the State has been said to be
exercising ‘general jurisdiction’ over the defendant.”) (citations omitted); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note
14, at 1136 (stating that “general jurisdiction” is the “power to adjudicate any kind of controversy when
jurisdiction is based on relationships, direct or indirect, between the forum and the person or persons whose
legal rights are to be affected”); Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business
Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L. REV. 671, 672 (2012) (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851) (“General jurisdiction is
the branch of personal jurisdiction that allows a forum state to assert judicial authority over ‘any and all claims’
against a defendant that has a sufficiently close connection to the state—even claims arising from conduct
elsewhere that is completely unrelated to the state.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 869 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
“general jurisdiction” as “[a] court’s authority to hear all claims against a defendant . . . without any showing
that a connection exists between the claims and the forum state”).
16. See Howard B. Stravitz, Introduction to Personal Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: The
Implications of McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tires, 63 S.C. L. REV. 463, 463 (2012) [hereinafter Stravitz,
Introduction] (noting that the personal jurisdiction opinions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011 “were
the first cases on personal jurisdiction in twenty-two years”); Richard D. Freer, Personal Jurisdiction in the
Twenty-First Century: The Ironic Legacy of Justice Brennan, 63 S.C. L. REV. 551, 551 (2012) (noting that the
personal jurisdiction decisions issued by the U.S. Supreme Court in 2011 were “the Supreme Court’s first
efforts at applying International Shoe Co. v. Washington since . . . 1990”).
17. 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
18. See id. at 2785, 2787–91.
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defendant. While McIntyre caused an immediate outcry among academics and
20
practitioners, Goodyear generally is thought to have been rightly decided and is
21
considered a positive development in the law. That being said, several
commentators have noted that the “essentially at home” test, as articulated by the
22
Court, is not a lesson in clarity.
A. General Personal Jurisdiction Pre-Goodyear
The Court’s most notable personal jurisdiction jurisprudence began well over
23
a century ago, with its seminal decision in Pennoyer v. Neff. In that case, the
19. 131 S. Ct. at 2850–51.
20. For example, the South Carolina Law Review hosted a Symposium entitled “Personal Jurisdiction
for the Twenty-First Century: The Implications of McIntyre and Goodyear Dunlop Tires” on October 13 and
14, 2011. Stravitz, Introduction, supra note 16, at 463. The journal’s Symposium issue alone includes ten
articles analyzing and critiquing McIntyre. See generally id. The consensus seems to be that the U.S. Supreme
Court got it wrong, or at the very least, greatly muddied the waters of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. See,
e.g., Adam N. Steinman, The Lay of the Land: Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 481, 491 (2012) (“The lack of any majority opinion in McIntyre largely thwarts the
possibility of ‘greater clarity,’ at least in the short term.”); John Vail, Six Questions in Light of J. McIntyre
Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REV. 517, 517 (2012) (“[T]he result in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro is viscerally upsetting, and the plurality opinion is intellectually perplexing. . . . I make no secret that I
think the case was wrongly decided.”); Michael H. Hoffheimer, General Personal Jurisdiction After Goodyear
Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 549, 550–51 (2012) (“[McIntyre] provoked a
spirited dissent and was greeted with much criticism and alarm.”) (citations omitted); Paul D. Carrington,
Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L. REV. 637, 641 (2012) (“The McIntyre case was . . .
wrongly decided.”).
21. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528 (“I believe that [Goodyear] will prove to be one of the
wisest and most consequential jurisdictional decisions in recent years. . . . [I]ts apparent constriction of general
jurisdiction . . . represents a positive development.”); Feder, supra note 15, at 673 (“Goodyear . . . goes a long
way toward putting general jurisdiction, for the first time, on a solid theoretical footing.”); Peddie, supra note 7,
at 726 (stating that “the Supreme Court’s decision in Goodyear represents a predictable, necessary, and
incremental step in the Court’s continuing efforts to keep jurisdictional rules in line with the realities of modern
transnational commerce”). But see Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 609 (“Justice Ginsberg’s opinion conflates a
variety of approaches but fails to communicate a coherent, shared vision of the underlying principles of
personal jurisdiction. . . . This Article argues that even the most generous reading of the opinion leaves
important practical questions unanswered.”).
22. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; Quick, supra note 13, at 586 (“While Goodyear does
clarify that the stream of commerce doctrine is not applicable to general jurisdiction analysis, neither [Goodyear
nor McIntyre] provides the degree of clarity going forward that practitioners had hoped for when the Court
agreed to hear the cases in tandem at the beginning of the term.”).
23. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Since the Court rendered its decision in Goodyear, numerous commentators
have discussed the history of general personal jurisdiction in great detail. See, e.g., Hoffheimer, supra note 20,
at 553–69; Quick, supra note 13, at 553–62; Peddie, supra note 7, at 713–15; Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Nineteenth Century Personal Jurisdiction Doctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64 FLA. L. REV. 387,
390–412, 422–24 (2012) [hereinafter Rhodes, Nineteenth Century]. And, of course, the topic was discussed in
the literature at great length prior to the 2011 decision. See, e.g., Robert J. Condlin, “Defendant Veto” or
“Totality of the Circumstances”? It’s Time for the Supreme Court to Straighten Out the Personal Jurisdiction
Standard Once Again, 54 CATH. U. L. REV. 53, 56–60, 66–72, 96–100 (2004); Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes,
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 812–18, 829–55 (2004) [hereinafter Rhodes,
Clarifying General Jurisdiction]; Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at General Jurisdiction, 66 TEX. L. REV.
721, 727–72 (1988); Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General Jurisdiction, 101 HARV. L. REV. 610, 614–30 (1988)
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Court found that the defendant’s presence within a court’s geographic territory
was a necessary prerequisite for the exercise of personal jurisdiction over the
24
defendant. More importantly, however, the Court tied personal jurisdiction
directly to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by stating that
the legitimacy of void judgments—i.e., judgments not entitled to full faith and
credit by other states—could be questioned “‘on the ground that proceedings in a
court of justice to determine the personal rights and obligations of parties over
25
whom that court has no jurisdiction do not constitute due process of law.’”
While the Court did not state that the Due Process Clause provides the
substantive criteria for determining whether a court’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction is appropriate, later iterations of the Court seem to interpret the
26
opinion that way.
For example, in its next pivotal case on personal jurisdiction, International
27
Shoe Co. v. Washington, the Court focused on the “requirements” imposed by
the Due Process Clause: “[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a
defendant to a judgment in personam, . . . he have certain minimum contacts with

[hereinafter Twitchell, Myth]; von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1135–44; Kristopher B. Knox, Note,
Davis v. St. John’s Health System, Inc.: General Jurisdiction, the Door is Ajar, But How Far Will It Open?, 56
ARK. L. REV. 647, 650–60 (2003); Kristina L. Angus, Note, The Demise of General Jurisdiction: Why the
Supreme Court Must Define the Parameters of General Jurisdiction, 36 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 63, 66–72 (2002);
see also Quick, supra note 13, at 551 (citing Andrew L. Strauss, Beyond National Law: The Neglected Role of
the International Law of Personal Jurisdiction in Domestic Courts, 36 HARV. INT’L L.J. 373, 381 (1995)) (“It is
possible that personal jurisdiction has been the subject of more academic commentary than any other area of
American law.”). Therefore, Part II.A. of this Article is not meant to provide a comprehensive history of general
personal jurisdiction but rather to offer only a very brief summary in an attempt to give context to the rest of the
piece.
24. Wendy Collins Perdue, What’s “Sovereignty” Got to Do with It? Due Process, Personal
Jurisdiction, and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REV. 729, 733–34 (2012); see Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733) (“Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render
judgment in personam is grounded on their de facto power over the defendant’s person. Hence his presence
within the territorial jurisdiction of court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding
him.”); Quick, supra note 13, at 556 (citing Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 722) (“The jurisdictional standard at the [turn
of the twentieth century], as established in Pennoyer, restricted jurisdictional authority to persons or corporate
entities ‘present’ within the state’s territorial boundaries.”).
25. Perdue, supra note 24, at 731 (quoting Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733); see also id. at 730 (“It is [in
Pennoyer] that the Court . . . , for the first time, introduced the Due Process Clause into personal jurisdiction
doctrine.”); Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 534 (“Pennoyer v. Neff constitutionalized the law of personal
jurisdiction. It held that assertions of jurisdiction by courts that lacked legitimate authority over the defendant
violated the Due Process Clause.”) (citations omitted).
26. Perdue, supra note 24, at 732–34, 738–39; see also Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence of the Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245, 1246 (2011) (“It is
debatable . . . whether Pennoyer actually invoked the Due Process Clause to set substantive limitations on statecourt jurisdiction. It is at least as likely that the Pennoyer Court simply meant that due process principles give
the defendant the right to attack an assertion of jurisdiction under whatever rules the forum state sets, but set no
geographical boundaries on the state’s assertions of jurisdiction over non-residents.”).
27. 326 U.S. at 310.
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it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
28
play and substantial justice.’” The Court explained that:
[w]hether due process is satisfied must depend . . . upon the quality and
nature of the activity in relation to the fair and orderly administration of
the laws which it was the purpose of the due process clause to insure.
That clause does not contemplate that a state may make binding a
judgment in personam against an individual or corporate defendant with
29
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
In regard to corporations, the Court stated that “there have been instances in
which the continuous corporate operations within a state were thought so
substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action
30
arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.” Thus, the opinion
was significant not only for replacing personal jurisdiction’s “presence”
31
requirement with a “contacts” or “conduct” requirement, but also for
32
introducing—albeit without naming—the concept of general jurisdiction.
The Court went on to discuss this new notion of general personal jurisdiction
33
in only two cases prior to rendering its opinion in Goodyear : Perkins v. Benguet
34
Consolidated Mining Co. and Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v.
35
Hall. In Perkins, the Court stated that “[t]he essence of the issue . . . at the
36
constitutional level, is . . . one of general fairness to the corporation.” The Court
found that the Due Process Clause did not preclude an Ohio state court from
exercising jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation to adjudicate a cause of
action that did not arise out of or relate to the corporation’s activity in Ohio,
because the company’s president “carried on in Ohio a continuous and systematic
37
supervision” of the company’s activities. This “continuous and systematic
28. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
29. Id. at 319 (citations omitted).
30. Id. at 318 (citing Missouri, K. & T.R. Co. v. Reynolds, 255 U.S. 565 (1921)); Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)).
31. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Peddie, supra note 7, at 713–14; Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara
to Fair Play and Substantial Justice?, 63 S.C. L. REV. 745, 747–48 (2012) [hereinafter Stravitz, Sayonara];
Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 561; Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 812–13; Quick,
supra note 13, at 556–58.
32. See, e.g., Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 535 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318) (noting that the
International Shoe Court’s statement “that there have been ‘instances in which the continuous corporate
operations within a state were thought so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on
[unrelated] causes of action’” is “what we now deem general jurisdiction”); B. Glenn George, In Search of
General Jurisdiction, 64 TUL. L. REV. 1097, 1103 (1990) (“In modern terminology, the [International Shoe]
Court acknowledged the use of general jurisdiction in appropriate cases.”).
33. E.g., Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Feder, supra note 15, at 674.
34. 342 U.S. 437 (1952).
35. 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
36. Perkins, 342 U.S. at 445.
37. Id. at 448.
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supervision” consisted of maintaining a temporary company headquarters from
which the president drafted business correspondence, distributed paychecks,
maintained active company bank accounts, held directors’ meetings, and
38
developed policies.
In contrast, the Helicopteros Court found a Texas state court’s exercise of
general jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation to be inappropriate where
the company’s chief executive officer made only one trip to Texas, accepted
checks drawn on a Texas bank, made purchases from a Texas company, and sent
39
personnel to Texas for training. The Court held that such contacts did not
“constitute the kind of continuous and systematic general business contacts the
40
Court found to exist in Perkins” and were, therefore, “insufficient to satisfy the
41
requirements of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” While
these opinions provide concrete examples of when a corporation is or is not
subject to general jurisdiction, they do little to guide the lower courts in terms of
the specific nature, number, and frequency of contacts necessary to establish
42
general jurisdiction on any other sets of facts. Accordingly, even though Perkins
was the only Supreme Court case to uphold a state court’s exercise of general
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation, lower courts greatly expanded the
doctrine’s reach beyond the location of a pseudo-headquarters as approved in that
43
case. In particular, courts regularly exercise general jurisdiction over
corporations that do “continuous and systematic business” or have “regular and
44
consistent commercial activities” in the forum state. Thus, the general
jurisdiction standard was begging for clarification when Goodyear reached the
Supreme Court.

38. Id. at 447–48.
39. Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 415–16.
40. Id. at 416.
41. Id. at 418–19.
42. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 674–75 (“The standard that most lower courts extracted from
[Perkins and Helicopteros]—a requirement of ‘continuous and systematic’ contacts—provided little meaningful
guidance. Among other things, it failed to address what types of contacts are necessary, how extensive those
contacts should be, and how continuous they must be.”) (citations omitted); Knox, supra note 23, at 667
(“[O]nly two Supreme Court cases have been decided on general personal jurisdiction grounds, neither of which
adequately defined what constituted a sufficient level of contact to support general jurisdiction. . . . Instead, the
Court’s general jurisdiction opinions have done no more than simply list the contacts present and then render an
assessment of whether those contacts were ‘systematic and continuous.’”); Angus, supra note 23, at 79 (“In
making their decisions, neither the Perkins Court nor the Helicopteros Court established any guidelines as to the
parameters of general jurisdiction.”).
43. See Feder, supra note 15, at 675 (“[L]ower courts have expanded general jurisdiction well beyond
[Perkins], applying it even to corporations with conspicuously insubstantial connections to the forum.”).
44. Mary Twitchell, Why We Keep Doing Business With Doing-Business Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 171, 173 [hereinafter Twitchell, Doing Business].
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B. Goodyear and the “Essentially at Home” Test
On September 28, 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown to determine “[w]hether a
foreign corporation is subject to general personal jurisdiction, on causes of action
not arising out of or related to any contacts between it and the forum state,
merely because other entities distribute in the forum state products placed in the
45
stream of commerce by the defendant.” In that case, North Carolina residents
sued the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company (incorporated in Ohio), as well as
three of its foreign subsidiaries (incorporated in Luxembourg, Turkey, and
France), in North Carolina state court on a products liability claim resulting from
46
an accident that occurred abroad. The foreign corporations moved to dismiss the
47
case for lack of personal jurisdiction. In affirming the trial court’s denial of the
motion, the court of appeals held that North Carolina had general jurisdiction
over the defendants because the defendants had placed their products (though
products different than those at issue in the lawsuit) into the stream of commerce,
the defendants had done nothing to prevent the products from reaching North
48
Carolina, and the products had in fact eventually reached North Carolina. In
addition, the court of appeals found that North Carolina had an interest in
providing a forum for its aggrieved citizens and that the plaintiffs would be
49
burdened by having to travel abroad to litigate their claims.
After the North Carolina Supreme Court denied review, the foreign
defendants petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari, arguing that
the North Carolina courts had “vastly exceed[ed] the scope of general jurisdiction
50
permitted by [the U.S. Supreme] Court’s decisions.” On June 27, 2011, the U.S.
Supreme Court issued its first decision regarding general personal jurisdiction
51
since Helicopteros was decided twenty-seven years prior. The Court held that
even though some of the foreign defendants’ products “had reached North
Carolina through the ‘stream of commerce,’” such a connection was “so limited”
that it “[did] not establish the ‘continuous and systematic’ affiliation necessary”
52
to allow North Carolina courts to exercise general personal jurisdiction. Thus,
53
the Court noted, the “petitioners [were] in no sense at home in North Carolina.”

45. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846 (2011) (No. 10-76), 2010 WL 2786988, at *i; see Mem. Granting Petition for Cert., 131 S. Ct. 63, 63
(2010).
46. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850–52.
47. Id. at 2852.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 2853.
50. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, supra note 45, at 12.
51. See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2846.
52. Id. at 2851.
53. Id. at 2857.
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In reaching its decision, the Court determined that the North Carolina courts
54
had conflated the standards for specific and general personal jurisdiction.
Therefore, the Court summarized the differences between the two, as well as the
55
development of general personal jurisdiction doctrine. In doing so, the Court
56
noted that International Shoe remains the “canonical opinion in this area.” The
Court also provided numerous interesting jurisdiction-related tidbits. Perhaps the
most tantalizing language offered by the Court is its articulation and explanation
of the general jurisdiction test:
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-state or
foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all claims against them
when their affiliations with the State are so “continuous and systematic”
57
as to render them essentially at home in the forum State.
...
For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general
jurisdiction is the individual’s domicile; for a corporation, it is an
equivalent place, one in which the corporation is fairly regarded as at
58
home.
Thus, the “essentially at home” standard was born. And, the only explicit help the
Court provided for interpreting that standard was its assertion that “[a]
corporation’s ‘continuous activity of some sorts within a state . . . is not enough
to support the demand that the corporation be amenable to suits unrelated to that
59
activity,’” and its comment that “Perkins . . . remains ‘[t]he textbook case of
60
general jurisdiction appropriately exercised over a foreign corporation.’”
In addition, while the Due Process Clause certainly was not the focus of the
Court’s opinion, the Court did frame the question before it as whether the North
Carolina state court’s exercise of general jurisdiction was “consistent with the
61
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” The Court also reiterated
its post-Pennoyer version of the link between personal jurisdiction and due
process—i.e., that the Due Process Clause provides the substantive criteria for
determining whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a particular

54. Id. at 2851; see id. at 2855 (“The North Carolina court’s stream-of-commerce analysis elided the
essential difference between case-specific and all-purpose (general) jurisdiction.”).
55. See id. at 2851, 2853–56.
56. Id. at 2853.
57. Id. at 2851 (citing Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (emphasis added).
58. Id. at 2853–54 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728) (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 2856 (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 318).
60. Id. (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
61. Id. at 2853.
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defendant is appropriate. Thus, the Court rejected the North Carolina Court of
Appeals’ attempt to justify its decision based on the state’s interest in providing a
convenient forum for the plaintiffs and retained the focus on the defendants’
63
connection to the forum.
C. Goodyear Aftermath
Although the reaction to the outcome in Goodyear has been positive,
academics and practitioners alike have lamented the “essentially at home”
64
language the Court used in reaching that outcome. According to one professor,
65
the opinion “raises as many questions as it answers,” particularly in regard to
66
the meaning of “essentially” and “at home” and the number of forums in which
67
a corporation can be considered essentially at home. While at least one
68
academic believes the language should be disregarded, most critics tend to agree
that Goodyear stands for something going forward—the question is what,
exactly.
In light of this confusion, several commentators have proposed
interpretations of Goodyear’s language in an attempt to provide guidance to the
69
lower courts. Some have taken a broad view of the Court’s vague language. For
62. Id. (“The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment sets the outer boundaries of a state
tribunal’s authority to proceed against a defendant.”).
63. See id. at 2857 (“[P]etitioners are in no sense at home in North Carolina. Their attenuated
connections to the State fall far short of the [sic] ‘the continuous and systematic general business contacts’
necessary to empower North Carolina to entertain suit against them on claims unrelated to anything that
connects them to the State.”) (citations omitted); see id. at 2857 n.5 (“As earlier noted, the North Carolina Court
of Appeals invoked the State’s ‘well-recognized interest in providing a forum in which its citizens are able to
seek redress for injuries that they have sustained.’ But ‘[g]eneral jurisdiction to adjudicate has in [United States]
practice never been based on the plaintiff’s relationship to the forum.’”) (citations omitted).
64. See infra text accompanying notes 66–89.
65. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528.
66. Id. at 533; see Feder, supra note 15, at 677.
67. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 533; Feder, supra note 15, at 677.
68. See Todd David Peterson, The Timing of Minimum Contacts After Goodyear and McIntyre, 80 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 202, 217 (2011) (“A better reading of the case would be to focus on the particular facts of
Goodyear and limit its meaning to the conclusion that the stream-of-commerce theory may not be utilized to
establish general jurisdiction.”).
69. This Article discusses the proposed interpretations that are the most thoroughly developed in the
literature. However, commentators have cursorily mentioned other potential explanations of Goodyear, as well.
See, e.g., Linda J. Silberman, Goodyear and Nicastro: Observations from a Transnational and Comparative
Perspective, 63 S.C. L. REV. 591, 612 (2012) (predicting that “Goodyear will be read to identify a place where
the corporation can said to be ‘present’ in the same way that the physical presence of the individual defendant is
manifest”); Peterson, supra note 68, at 216–17 (stating that, despite language in the opinion that could be
interpreted to limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a corporation to states in which it is incorporated or
has its principal place of business, “a more appropriate interpretation of Goodyear would be that some
substantial volume of sales made directly into the forum state will continue to be sufficient”); Quick, supra note
13 at 593 (“[T]he Court seemed to imply that, depending on a corporation’s business structure and operations,
there may be an infinite number of places where a business could be found at home” but, “[a]t the very least, it
would seem that a company must have formally registered to do business in a state, established a physical
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example, Professor Allan Stein believes that, while the Court has significantly
70
limited the availability of general jurisdiction, a corporation can be essentially at
home in multiple places and that the default location should not be to a
corporation’s principal place of business (or, “the locus of corporate decision71
making”). Rather, he thinks the “essentially at home” standard should be a
72
measure of “whether the defendant would consider itself at home in the forum.”
Thus, Professor Stein proposes that in order to be subject to general jurisdiction
in a particular forum, the corporation must be physically present in the forum,
litigation must be as convenient for the corporation there as elsewhere, and the
73
corporation’s activities there must be similar to its activities elsewhere. In
addition to those criteria, Professor Stein advocates for consideration of the
presence of employees, manufacturing facilities, and corporate offices in making
74
the determination.
Collyn Peddie, counsel for the respondents in Goodyear, similarly rejects the
notion that the place in which a corporation is essentially at home is limited to its
75
state of incorporation or principal place of business. Rather, she believes “the
76
Court imposed a broader, more ambiguous standard” to allow for flexible
77
application “as corporate structures and means of commerce evolve.” Thus, Ms.
Peddie proposes that the Court’s ruling allows for the use of an ever-changing
test that “take[s] into account a host of plus factors, far too lengthy to list,” that
78
should be “give[n] . . . different weight in different circumstances.”
79
Other commentators view the Goodyear opinion as much more limiting. For
example, Meir Feder, the attorney who represented Goodyear in the litigation,
thinks the Court may have intended for the “essentially at home” language to

presence in the state, appointed agents in the state, and so on before general jurisdiction might attach.”).
70. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 531–32 (discussing the “essentially at home” standard as a
“constraint” that “aligns the Court with many academic commentators . . . who have advocated limiting
significantly the operation of general jurisdiction”).
71. Id. at 546.
72. Id. at 538. According to Professor Stein, “[t]his approach is based on the premise that defendants
have a unique relationship with their home; the relative singularity of that relationship is at the core of its
justification.” Id. Another “touchstone” in the inquiry is “whether the judge or jury would view imposition of
liability on the defendant to be an externality.” Id. at 543.
73. Id. at 545–47. Professor Stein thinks a corporation also should be subject to general jurisdiction in its
state or states of incorporation based on the corporation’s voluntary consent to the state’s governance. Id. at
547.
74. Id.
75. See Peddie, supra note 7, at 713, 717.
76. Id. at 713.
77. Id. at 717. Ms. Peddie also states that in treating the “essentially at home” language as the
“traditional standard . . . , the Court . . . focused on the supervisory aspect of Perkins, which, in modern
parlance, would have allowed a court to exercise general jurisdiction where the corporate ‘brain’ resides.” Id.
That, she contends, was the Court’s “effort to reconcile Goodyear and the Hertz line of decisions.” Id.
78. Id. at 726.
79. See infra text accompanying notes 81–86.
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refer only to a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of
80
business. Likewise, Professor Michael Hoffheimer has suggested that the
opinion can be read to restrict general jurisdiction over corporations to those
81
limited locations. However, Professor Hoffheimer ultimately believes that such
a restriction “would effect a radical shift” that is not supported by personal
82
jurisdiction precedent. Thus, he proposes that a “fair reading of the opinion”
suggests that, while it will be “unusual,” there can be other states in which
83
“extraordinarily high levels of activity may support . . . general jurisdiction.” He
states that determining whether the “essentially at home” standard is satisfied
84
will “require an inquiry into ‘activity’ and ‘contacts,’” such as where the
corporation conducts “most” of its business or has “permanent offices,
85
warehouses, or substantial assets.”
Somewhere in between Professor Stein’s and Ms. Peddie’s expansive
interpretations and Professor Hoffheimer’s and Mr. Feder’s narrow
interpretations lies Professor Charles Rhodes’ theory. He believes that a
corporation may be subject to general jurisdiction in places other than the

80. Feder, supra note 15, at 677. In drawing this conclusion, Mr. Feder focused on the Court’s
comparison of “the ‘paradigm’ forum for general jurisdiction over a corporation with an individual’s home
state,” id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853–54 (2011)), the
Court’s reliance on a secondary source in which the author “‘identif[ied] domicile, place of incorporation, and
principal place of business as paradig[m] bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction,’” id. (quoting Goodyear,
131 S. Ct. at 2854), and the Court’s reference to Perkins as “the ‘textbook case of general jurisdiction,’” id.
(quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856). Other commentators have expressed this narrow view of Goodyear, as
well. See Stephen B. Burbank, International Civil Litigation in U.S. Courts: Becoming a Paper Tiger?, 33 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 663, 670 (2012) (stating that Goodyear “may require that a corporation either be incorporated or
have its principal place of business in the forum”); James R. Pielemeier, Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome
Refinement of the Language of General Personal Jurisdiction, 16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969, 990 (2012)
(noting that the Goodyear Court “arguably suggested” that a corporate defendant will be “‘at home’” only in its
state of incorporation and principal place of business) (citation omitted).
81. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 581–82 (“Under [a] broader reading, the Court disfavors general
jurisdiction over corporations and restricts such jurisdiction to those states in which corporations were
traditionally subject to general jurisdiction—the state of incorporation and the principal place of business.”). In
identifying this possible interpretation, Professor Hoffheimer focuses on the Court’s references to International
Shoe and Perkins. See id. at 584–85.
82. Id. at 587.
83. Id. at 592; see also Lem E. Montgomery III & Fred E. (Trey) Bourn III, Why Expansion of
Commerce and Trade Does Not Expand the Reach of the Courts, 52 FOR THE DEF., NOV. 2011, at 42, 87
(“While the [Goodyear] decision did not define ‘at home,’ a defendant’s state of incorporation and principal
place of business may be the only states where general jurisdiction can be guaranteed. At a minimum, general
jurisdiction will now require a significant business presence in the forum state.”).
84. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 595.
85. Id. at 602–03. In an article released just prior to this Article going to press, Professor Carol Andrews
argues for an interpretation of Goodyear that is similar to Professor Hoffheimer’s interpretation. See Carol
Andrews, Another Look at General Personal Jurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 999, 1059, 1061–62
(2012). Professor Andrews believes that only “incorporation and principal place of business are proper bases for
general jurisdiction” under Goodyear, id. at 1059, but that, “in rare cases,” a corporation might have more than
one principal place of business based on business activities, id. at 1062.
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86

location of its principal place of business and state of incorporation, but that
general jurisdiction “necessitates, at the very minimum, that the nonresident
corporation act similarly to a local domiciliary by directing, controlling, and
87
coordinating its operations on a continuous basis from the forum state.”
As is evident from this brief overview of the literature, the Goodyear Court
spurred a burst of activity from the legal community. Academics and
practitioners have attempted to interpret the Court’s “essentially at home”
88
language, producing a wide range of tests in the process. However, the problem
with each of the above interpretations and proposed tests is that they either fail to
strictly comply with all of the Court’s language in light of existing precedent, or
they run contrary to the interests and goals inherent in due process considerations
(i.e., fairness, reasonableness, and predictability for the defendant) and
jurisdictional analyses (simplicity and administrative efficiency).
III. EXAMINING THE “PRECEDENT”: HERTZ AND THE “PRINCIPAL PLACE OF
BUSINESS” TEST
The questions left open in Goodyear are significant. And, looking at the
Supreme Court’s track record in addressing general personal jurisdiction, chances
are that it will not speak to this issue again for some time. However, the Court
did tackle a relatively similar issue in the not-so-distant past: the location of a
corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of diversity subject matter
89
jurisdiction.
“Subject matter jurisdiction” concerns a court’s ability to adjudicate a case
90
based on the nature of the controversy. Thus, in addition to the requirement that
a court have personal jurisdiction over a defendant, as discussed above, a party’s
86. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 426.
87. Id. at 433. Professor Rhodes bases the requirement for maintaining some sort of locus of control in
the forum state on the Court’s opinion in Hertz Corp. v. Friend, in which it defined a corporation’s “principal
place of business” for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 429 n.258; infra Part III. He
notes that “the key attribute of a corporation’s ‘home’ in other legal contexts [including subject matter
jurisdiction] is whether it directs and manages the majority of its business operations from [a particular] state.”
Rhodes, Nineteenth Century supra note 23 at 428 (emphasis added). Therefore, Professor Rhodes contends,
because the Goodyear Court softened the “home” language with modifiers like “essentially” and “fairly
regarded as,” it is possible that multiple states may exercise general jurisdiction over a given corporation. See
id. at 428–29.
88. See supra Part II.C.
89. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010).
90. See, e.g., Frederic M. Bloom, Jurisdiction’s Noble Lie, 61 STAN. L. REV. 971, 987 (2009) (“[Subject
matter jurisdiction] asks whether a particular court has the authority to resolve a particular type of suit. . . . It
depends . . . on substantive law, party citizenship, and the basis of the litigants’ claims.”) (citation omitted);
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004) (defining “subject-matter jurisdiction” as “[j]urisdiction over the
nature of the case and the type of relief sought; the extent to which a court can rule on the conduct of persons or
the status of things”); 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 3522 (3d ed. 2009) (discussing over which types of cases state and federal courts have subject matter
jurisdiction)[hereinafter WRIGHT & MILLER].
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ability to hale a defendant into court requires that the court have subject matter
91
jurisdiction over the case. Federal courts have limited subject matter
92
jurisdiction and, generally speaking, can hear cases involving a question of
federal law and cases between citizens of different states (even if those cases
93
involve only questions of state law) . The latter type of subject matter
94
jurisdiction is called “diversity jurisdiction.” While an individual’s citizenship is
relatively easy to ascertain, the question of how to determine a corporation’s
citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction was debated from the outset and
continued until 2010 when the Court issued its unanimous opinion in Hertz Corp.
95
v. Friend.
A. Corporate Citizenship and the Pre-Hertz “Principal Place of Business”
Tests
The Supreme Court began dealing with questions of corporate citizenship as
96
early as 1809. Because corporations were considered “‘intangible’” and
91. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 90, § 3522.
It is a principle of first importance that the federal courts are tribunals of limited subject matter
jurisdiction. . . . . They are empowered to hear only those cases that (1) are within the judicial power
of the United States, as defined in the Constitution, and (2) that have been entrusted to them by a
jurisdictional grant by Congress. A federal court’s entertaining a case that is not within its subject
matter jurisdiction is no mere technical violation; it is nothing less than an unconstitutional
usurpation of state judicial power.
Id. (citations omitted).
92. Id.
93. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all
Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and
maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to
Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—
between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or
Subjects.
Id.
94. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 90, § 3602. Congress currently limits diversity jurisdiction to
cases in which the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(a) (2012). The diversity of citizenship statute more fully outlines the parameters:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between—
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state . . . ;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are additional
parties; and
(4) a foreign state . . . as plaintiff and citizens of a State or of different States.
Id.
95. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
96. See id. at 1188 (discussing Bank of United States v. Deveaux, 5 Cranch 61 (1809)).
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97

“‘artificial,’” the Court found that a corporation should be deemed a citizen of
98
the states of which its shareholders were citizens. In 1844, the Court simplified
99
the test and held that a corporation was a citizen of its state of incorporation.
However, the rationale for allowing diversity jurisdiction in the first place was to
provide a forum where out-of-state parties would not suffer from local
100
101
prejudice, and it became clear that corporations were abusing the system. A
corporation with substantial business activities in a given state (and which was,
therefore, not likely to suffer prejudice in that state) was able to remove cases to
federal court when sued by citizens of that state simply because it had been
102
incorporated elsewhere. Thus, in order to reduce the burden on the federal
courts and to better effectuate the intent behind diversity jurisdiction, Congress
103
decided in 1958 that corporations should have dual citizenship —i.e.,
corporations were deemed to be citizens of their state or states of incorporation
104
and of the state in which their “principal place of business” was located.
97. Id. (quoting Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 86).
98. See id. (citing Deveaux, 5 Cranch at 91–92) (“[In Deveaux,] the Court held that a corporation could
invoke the federal courts’ diversity jurisdiction based on a pleading that the corporation’s shareholders were all
citizens of a different State from the defendants, as ‘the term citizen ought to be understood as it is used in the
constitution, and as it is used in other laws. That is, to describe the real persons who come into court, in this
case, under their corporate name.’”).
99. See id. (citing Louisville, C. & C.R. Co. v. Letson, 2 How. 497 (1844)) (“[In Letson, the Court] held
that a corporation was to be deemed an artificial person of the State by which it had been created, and its
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes determined accordingly.”).
100. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 2, 4–7 (1932)) (stating that “diversity jurisdiction’s basic
rationale [was] opening the federal courts’ doors to those who might otherwise suffer from local prejudice
against out-of-state parties”); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 (1958) (noting that diversity jurisdiction is meant to
protect foreign parties “against the prejudices of local courts and local juries by making available to them the
benefits and safeguards of the Federal courts”); GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSEN, UNDERSTANDING
CIVIL PROCEDURE § 5.04, at 131 (4th ed. 2009) (“The traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is that it
protects out-of-state litigants from local bias.”).
101. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188 (citing S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 4) (“Through its choice of the State of
incorporation, a corporation could manipulate federal-court jurisdiction, for example, opening the federal
courts’ doors in a State where it conducted nearly all its business by filing incorporation papers elsewhere.”); S.
REP. NO. 72-530, at 4 (“Since the Supreme Court has decided that a corporation is a citizen . . . it has become a
common practice for corporations to be incorporated in one State while they do business in another. And there
is no doubt but that it often occurs simply for the purpose of being able to have the advantage of choosing
between two tribunals in case of litigation.”).
102. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188; S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 4; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4, as reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101–02.
103. S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3, as reprinted in 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101 (discussing the corporate
dual citizenship requirement and stating that “it will ease the workload of our Federal courts by reducing the
number of cases involving corporations which come into Federal district courts on the fictional premise that a
diversity of citizenship exists”); see Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1188–90 (discussing the genesis of the corporate dual
citizenship definition as including a belief by many members of Congress that corporations were manipulating
federal diversity jurisdiction and a belief by federal judges that their dockets contained too many diversity
cases).
104. Pub. L. No. 85-554, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (1958) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332). In December 2011,
after both Hertz and Goodyear were decided, Congress amended the definition of corporate citizenship in
§ 1332 to provide that “a corporation shall be deemed to be a citizen of every State and foreign state by which it
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Congress borrowed the “principal place of business” language from the
Bankruptcy Act and anticipated that the lower courts would be guided by
105
precedent interpreting that statute. At the time, however, courts had been
106
applying two different tests in that context. As a result, the courts were left on
their own to determine how to interpret “principal place of business” for purposes
107
of diversity jurisdiction, and several tests surfaced. The Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals applied a “nerve center” test, which focused on the corporation’s
managerial activities and under which a “corporation’s brain”—or the source of
its decision-making, control, and direction—was considered to be its principal
108
place of business. The Third Circuit applied the “corporate activities” test,
which focused on the corporation’s production- and service-related activities and
provided that a corporation’s principal place of business was where the majority
of the corporation’s manufacturing facilities, sales centers, employees, and
109
property were located. In addition, some courts utilized both the “nerve center”
and “corporate activities” tests. For example, the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth, and
Eleventh Circuits applied the “total activity” test, which combined the “nerve
center” and “corporate activities” tests by considering the location of both the
110
managerial and production- and service-related activities. The First, Second,
Fourth, and Ninth Circuits kept both tests in their arsenal, applying one or the
111
other based on certain presumptions. “Not surprisingly, different circuits (and

has been incorporated and of the State or foreign state where it has its principal place of business . . . .” 28
U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (emphasis added); see Pub. L. No. 112-63, 125 Stat. 758, 758–59 (2011) (codified at 28
U.S.C. § 1332).
105. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1189–90 (citations omitted); S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 5.
106. Lindsey D. Saunders, Note, Determining a Corporation’s Principal Place of Business: A Uniform
Approach to Diversity Jurisdiction, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1475, 1478 (2006) (“Around the time of the 1958
amendment, courts used two tests to determine a corporation’s principal place of business under the Bankruptcy
Act: the ‘home office’ test and the ‘actual place of operations’ test.”) (citing Note, A Corporation’s Principal
Place of Business for Purposes of Diversity Jurisdiction, 44 MINN. L. REV. 308, 316 (1959)).
107. See Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1190–92; Saunders, supra note 106, at 1478–79. This Section provides a
very brief overview of the various “principal place of business” tests in use prior to the Court’s decision in
Hertz. For a more thorough discussion of the tests, see Saunders, supra note 106, at 1479–86 and 13F CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3625 (3d ed. 2009).
108. Wis. Knife Words v. Nat’l Metal Crafters, 781 F.2d 1280, 1282 (7th Cir. 1986); see Saunders,
supra note 106, at 1479 (citations omitted) (“The nerve center test considers a corporation’s principal place of
business to be the place from which corporate decision making, policy making, control, and direction
emanate. . . . Under this test, the corporation’s principal place of business will usually, if not always, be the state
in which its executive headquarters are located.”).
109. See Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960); Saunders, supra note 106, at
1480–81 (citations omitted) (“Under the corporate activities test, a corporation is a citizen of the state where the
majority of the corporation’s production and service activities are located.”).
110. Saunders, supra note 106, at 1481–82 (citing Teal Energy USA, Inc. v. GT, Inc., 369 F.3d 873,
877 (5th Cir. 2004); Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 163 (6th Cir. 1993); Capitol Indem. Corp. v.
Russellville Steel Co., 367 F.3d 831, 836 (8th Cir. 2004); Gadlin v. Sybron Int’l Corp., 222 F.3d 797, 799 (10th
Cir. 2000); MacGinnitie v. Hobbs Group, LLC, 420 F.3d 1234, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005)).
111. Id. at 1484–86 (citing Diaz-Rodriguez v. Pep Boys Corp., 410 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2005); R.G.
Barry Corp. v. Mushroom Makers, Inc., 612 F.2d 651, 655 (2d Cir. 1979); Peterson v. Cooley, 142 F.3d 181,
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sometimes different courts within a single circuit) . . . applied these highly
112
general multifactor tests in different ways.” This lack of uniformity prompted
the Supreme Court to take action.
B. Hertz and the “Nerve Center” Test
On June 8, 2009, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hertz Corp. v.
Friend to resolve the Circuit split regarding application of the diversity
113
jurisdiction statute’s “principal place of business” language. In that case, two
individual California citizens sued Hertz Corporation in California state court for
114
violations of California state laws. Hertz sought to remove the case to federal
115
court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The federal district court applied the
Ninth Circuit’s “principal place of business” test, which, in the case of a
corporation with far-flung operations, considered the principal place of business
to be the state in which the corporation had the greatest amount of business
116
activities. Only if no state contained a “substantial predominance” of business
activities would the court consider the corporation’s principal place of business
117
to be the nerve center. Because Hertz admittedly had significantly more of each
relevant business activity in California than in any other state, the district court
found that Hertz was a citizen of California even though its corporate
118
headquarters was located in New Jersey. Accordingly, the court remanded the

184 (4th Cir. 1998); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500 (9th Cir. 2001)).
112. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1191 (citation omitted).
113. See id. at 1187; Mem. Granting Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (No. 081107); Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, 8–9, Hertz, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (No. 08-1107) [hereinafter Petition for
Writ. of Certiorari, Hertz].
114. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1186. The two individuals also sought relief on behalf of a class of California
citizens. Id.
115. Id.
116. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand, Friend v. Hertz Corp., No. C-07-5222 MMC, 2008
WL 7071465, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 15, 2008).
117. Id. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California’s full articulation of the Ninth
Circuit’s test was as follows:
Where the majority of a corporation’s business activity does not take place in one state, the state in
which the corporation’s business activity is “significantly larger than any other state in which the
corporation conducts business” is the corporation’s principal place of business. In determining
whether a corporation’s business activity “substantially predominates in a given state,” a district
court must make a “comparison of that corporation’s business activity in the state at issue to its
business activity in other individual states.” In making such comparison, the court “employs a
number of factors,” including “the location of employees, tangible property, production activities,
sources of income, and where sales take place.” If, however, “no state contains a substantial
predominance of a corporation’s business activities,” the corporation’s principal place of business is
its “nerve center,” which is “the state where the majority of its executive and administrative
functions are performed.”
Id. (citations omitted).
118. Id. at *2.
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case to state court because there was no diversity of citizenship among the
119
parties.
Hertz appealed the decision up to the U.S. Supreme Court, arguing that a
court cannot disregard the location of a corporation’s headquarters in determining
120
its principal place of business for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. On
February 23, 2010, the Court issued its seminal decision in Hertz, finally
providing a uniform test for determining a corporation’s principal place of
121
business. The Court held that “the phrase ‘principal place of business’ refers to
the place where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and
122
coordinate the corporation’s activities.” The Court used the lower federal
courts’ terminology and referred to this location as a corporation’s “nerve
center,” stating that “the ‘nerve center’ will typically be found at a corporation’s
123
headquarters.” Therefore, Hertz’s principal place of business was located in
124
New Jersey.
In rendering its decision, the Court “place[d] primary weight upon the need
for judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as
125
possible.” Thus, in addition to the statutory language- and intent-based
126
rationales the Court used to explain its decision, the Court emphasized the
importance of administrative simplicity:
[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute.
Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money
as the parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the
right court to decide those claims. . . . Judicial resources too are at stake.
Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subjectmatter jurisdiction exists, even when no party challenges it. So courts
benefit from straightforward rules under which they can readily assure
127
themselves of their power to hear a case.
The Court also highlighted the importance of predictability to corporations and
plaintiffs alike—the former when making business decisions and the latter when

119. Id. at *3.
120. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hertz, supra note 113, at *i.
121. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1185–86 (2010).
122. Id. at 1186.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 1195.
125. Id. at 1186.
126. Id. at 1192 (quoting 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 495 (2d ed. 1989)) (reasoning that
Congress’ use of the singular “place” in conjunction with the word “principal” “require[d] [the Court] to pick
out [one] ‘main, prominent’ or ‘leading’ place”); id. at 1194 (stating that the gross income test discussed in the
statute’s legislative history “offers a simplicity-related interpretative benchmark….”).
127. Id. at 1193 (citations omitted).
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128

deciding whether to bring a lawsuit in state court versus federal court.
According to the Court, the “nerve center” test provides administrative simplicity
and predictability because it “suggests a single location” rather than considering
business activities that often “lack a single principal place where they take
129
place.”
Another important consideration acknowledged throughout the Court’s
opinion is “the general purpose of diversity jurisdiction, i.e., an effort to find the
State where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice when it is
130
sued in a local court.” The Court discussed this underlying goal as the genesis
131
of the “principal place of business” language. After positing that the plethora of
“principal place of business” tests reflected the difficulty the lower courts had in
132
effectuating that objective, the Court indicated that the “nerve center” test
should in most cases identify the state where the corporation will suffer the least
133
prejudice. Thus, the Court ended a decades-long debate regarding an important
jurisdictional question by focusing on efficiency, predictability, and fairness.
IV. APPLYING THE “PRECEDENT”: USING HERTZ TO EXPLAIN GOODYEAR
Until the confusion surrounding the Court’s new “essentially at home”
standard is resolved, the lower courts will apply their own interpretations, leaving
general jurisdiction in much the same condition as diversity jurisdiction was in
pre-Hertz. Therefore, a more specific definition is needed, and, fortunately, Hertz
can help. While Hertz certainly is not binding precedent on the issue of general
personal jurisdiction, it should be used as persuasive evidence in deciphering the
134
Court’s language in Goodyear. In both cases, the Court was presented with the
same question: where are a corporation’s contacts so significant that it will not
suffer from local prejudice if forced to defend against litigation in state court? In
Hertz, the Court determined that location to be the corporation’s “nerve center.”
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1193–94.
130. Id. at 1192.
131. Id. at 1188.
132. Id. at 1192.
133. See id. at 1194 (“We . . . recognize that the use of a ‘nerve center’ test may in some cases produce
results that seem to cut against the basic rationale for 28 U.S.C. § 1332 . . . .”) (emphasis added).
134. A quick Westlaw search reveals that, as of the end of April 2013, only three courts had discussed
these two decisions in the same opinion. See Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 676 F.3d 774, 775, 778 n.4 (9th
Cir. 2011) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting); Global Tech. Int’l, Ltd. v. Cont’l Auto. Sys., Inc., C/A No. 0:12-3041CMC, 2013 WL 1809773, at *1–2, *4 (D.S.C. Apr. 29, 2013); Hallal v. Vicis Capital Master Fund Ltd., Civ.
Action No. 12-10166-NMG, 2013 WL 1192384, at *5 n.8, *8 (D. Mass. Feb. 25, 2013). In only one of those
opinions did the court appear to link Hertz’s “principal place of business” test with Goodyear’s “general
personal jurisdiction” test. See Global Tech. Int’l, Ltd., 2013 WL 1809773, at *4 (stating that a corporation’s
filing of a form listing its executive offices in a given location was not sufficient to establish that location as the
corporation’s principal place of business under Hertz, and so the exercise of general jurisdiction in that location
was not appropriate under Goodyear) (citations omitted).
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In Goodyear, the Court declared that location to be wherever the corporation is
“essentially at home.” Because the reasoning behind the outcomes was so
similar, the opinions should be reconciled. Doing so adds meaning to the Court’s
express language and use of precedent in Goodyear and explains why the Court
opted to announce such a seemingly vague test. Moreover, incorporating Hertz
creates a general jurisdiction test that addresses both due process and judicial
administration goals by producing fair, predictable, and reasonable results in a
simple and administratively-efficient manner—something the Court surely
intended.
A. Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Make the Most Sense of the Particular
Language Used by the Court in Light of Existing Precedent
Many commentators have already thoroughly analyzed the Court’s language
in Goodyear. As discussed above, some believe the Court meant to limit general
jurisdiction to only a corporation’s state of incorporation and principal place of
135
business. In addition to those locales, others believe the Court signaled
permission for a corporate defendant to be haled into court in any state in which
136
the corporation conducts substantial business activities or from which corporate
137
officers issue some level of control over the enterprise. Those interpretations,
however, do not fully comport with the Court’s express language, its references
to secondary materials, its reliance on precedent, or its continual rejection of
general jurisdiction (except in Perkins). Moreover, they do not align with the
Court’s recent opinion in Hertz. Rather, the interpretation that best explains the
Court’s “essentially at home” language, and makes the most sensible use of
precedent, is that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in its state of
incorporation and in the one state where its principal place of business, or nerve
center, is located. In the event the corporation does not have a nerve center
located within the United States, it is subject to general jurisdiction in the one
138
state, if any, in which it has a pseudo-nerve center (à la Perkins). If there is no
such state, the plaintiff must look to specific jurisdiction for recourse.

135. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 70–79 and 86–87 and accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
138. Contra Taylor Simpson-Wood, In the Aftermath of Goodyear Dunlop: Oyez! Oyez! Oyez! A Call
for a Hybrid Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in International Products Liability Controversies, 64 BAYLOR
L. REV. 113, 154 (2012) (“[T]he Court’s . . . confinement of general personal jurisdiction to Perkinsesque
scenarios . . . w[as] not pre-ordained by precedent.”) (citations omitted).
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1. A Corporation is “at Home” in Its State of Incorporation and in the
State Where Its Nerve Center is Located
The Court’s express language in Goodyear demonstrates its intent to allow
for the operation of general jurisdiction over a corporation in a maximum of two
139
states: its state of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place
140
of business. This intent is evident in the Court’s repeated use of the phrase “at
home” to indicate the locations in which a corporation can properly be subject to
141
general jurisdiction. For example, the Court equated the place in which a
corporation can be “fairly regarded as at home” with an “individual’s domicile,”
noting that those locations are the “paradigm forum[s] for the exercise of general
142
jurisdiction.” Because it has long been recognized that a corporation is
143
“domiciled” in its state of incorporation and in the state in which it has its
144
principal place of business, the Court’s express “at home” language should be
145
interpreted to refer only to those locations.
139. Corporations typically are incorporated in only one state. Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 735.
However, there may be special instances in which a corporation will have more than one state of incorporation.
See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 596. In those instances, the corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in
each of those states.
140. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 677 (noting that the Court hinted at limiting the exercise of
general jurisdiction over a corporation to only its state of incorporation and the state housing its principal place
of business). But see Peddie, supra note 7, at 713 (noting that “[the Court] could easily have restricted the place
in which a court could exercise general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to the state of the corporation’s
principal place of business or incorporation,” but that it did not); id. at 720.
141. See Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 2854, 2857 (2011).
Professor Todd Peterson believes that Justice Ginsburg’s use of the “at home” phrase to describe general
jurisdiction in McIntyre (the companion case to Goodyear) is also “strong[] evidence” of the Court’s “intent[] to
restrict the applicability of general jurisdiction to a defendant’s state of incorporation or principal place of
business.” Peterson, supra note 68, at 216 (citing J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2797
(2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)). However, Professor Peterson ultimately does not believe that is how the
opinion should be interpreted. See id. at 216–17.
142. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–54.
143. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 595.
144. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733 (“The law treats corporations like legal persons, and the
place of incorporation and the principal place of business are both analogous to domicile.”); Twitchell, Myth,
supra note 23, at 633 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction is almost always available at a defendant’s ‘home base.’ Courts
routinely exercise jurisdiction over individual defendants who are forum domiciliaries or habitual residents, and
over corporations where they are incorporated or where they have their principal place of business, without
regard to the nature of the cause of action.”). The Court itself said as much in McIntyre, the companion case to
Goodyear: “Citizenship or domicile—or, by analogy, incorporation or principal place of business for
corporations—also indicates general submission to a State’s powers.” McIntyre, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (citing
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854) (emphasis added). Over forty years ago, Professors von Mehren and Trautman
actually defined a corporation’s domicile as its state of incorporation and nerve center:
From the beginning in American practice, general adjudicatory jurisdiction over corporations and
other legal persons could be exercised by the community with which the legal person had its closest
and most continuing legal and factual connections. The community that chartered the corporation
and in which it has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of the community
of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence. If a corporation’s managerial and
administrative center is in a state other than its state of incorporation, presumably general
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The Court’s references to scholarly works also speak volumes about the
146
Court’s intent. For example, the Court relied on a seminal general jurisdiction
article authored by Professor Lea Brilmayer for the proposition that a corporation
is located “at home” in its “place of incorporation” and “principal place of
147
business.” In doing so, the Court described Professor Brilmayer’s article as
“identifying domicile, place of incorporation, and principal place of business as
148
‘paradig[m]’ bases for the exercise of general jurisdiction.”
This is,
presumably, where the Court obtained the “paradigm” language it used in
149
describing the “at home” test. Because the U.S. Supreme Court cites to journal
150
articles in less than one-third of its opinions (and is even less likely to do so
151
when the issue is not one of first impression ), the inclusion of this definition is
particularly meaningful.
The Court’s intended interpretation of the phrase “principal place of
business” is equally apparent in the Court’s express language and choice of
source materials. It is—or should be—safe to assume that by using a legal term
of art the Court meant for it to be given its legal definition. Therefore, because
the Court recently decided in Hertz that a corporation’s principal place of
business is not to be determined by the location of its corporate activities or
physical property, but rather that the principal place of business is the one place
from which “the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate
152
the corporation’s activities,” the phrase should be interpreted the same in this
153
context. Although further explanation of this clear term of art was unnecessary,

jurisdiction should exist in either community.
von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1141–42; see also Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 669 (“Because
a corporation’s headquarters is the functional equivalent of an individual defendant’s domicile, home base
jurisdiction should be available wherever the corporation is headquartered.”).
145. Cf. Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 585 (“The Court’s opinion identifies two places where a
corporation will be ‘at home’ and, thus, subject to general jurisdiction: the place of incorporation and the
principal place of business.”).
146. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853–56.
147. Id. at 2854 (citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728).
148. Id. (quoting Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 728).
149. See id. at 2853–54.
150. Whit D. Pierce & Anne E. Reuben, The Law Review is Dead; Long Live the Law Review: A Closer
Look at the Declining Judicial Citation of Legal Scholarship, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1185, 1203 tbl.6, 1206
(2010) (showing that the U.S. Supreme Court cited to a “law review” article, a “law journal” article, or both in
31.4% of its opinions between 2005 and 2009).
151. See id. at 1206 (“[T]he Court is generally more likely to cite a legal journal in a case in which it
mentions the words ‘first impression.’”).
152. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1186 (2010).
153. Cf. IBP, Inc. v. Alvarez, 546 U.S. 21, 34 (2005) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction [is]
that identical words used in different parts of the same statute are generally presumed to have the same
meaning.”). Professor Andrews also recently suggested that the Hertz “nerve center” test can be used to identify
a corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of general jurisdiction. See Andrews, supra note 85, at
1060 (“The state of a corporation’s principal place of business—at least as currently defined by the Court for
purposes of subject matter jurisdiction—also passes the Goodyear at-home test.”). She contends that, “in every
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the Court did reiterate that “‘continuous activity of some sorts’” is insufficient to
154
confer general jurisdiction. And, notably, Professor Brilmayer—in the very
article relied upon by the Goodyear Court when defining the “paradigm bases” of
general jurisdiction—explicitly rejected “activities” as a “paradigm bas[i]s of
155
general jurisdiction.” Thus, gone are the days when a corporation could be
haled into court based on “doing-business” factors such as the amount of sales,
156
warehouses, factories, or employees it has in a given state.
The Court’s repeated reliance on yet another pivotal personal jurisdiction
157
article (this one authored by Professors Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T.
Trautman), coupled with its reference to International Shoe as the “canonical
158
opinion” in personal jurisdiction jurisprudence, provides further support for
both of the above propositions (i.e., that “at home” for a corporation means its
state of incorporation and principal place of business, and that “principal place of
business” means nerve center). In laying the groundwork for its decision in
Goodyear, the Court used Professor von Mehren’s and Professor Trautman’s
159
article to help define the contours of specific and general jurisdiction. The
160
Court then referenced the article for further reading. Within the pages cited by
the Court is this statement:
Th[e] approach [in International Shoe] suggests that, absent the kind of
total, close, and continuing relations to a community implied in
incorporation or in the location of a head office within a state,
jurisdiction over legal persons—aside perhaps from the possibility of

case, the state of a corporation’s nerve center under Hertz also should qualify as the corporation’s home” under
Goodyear. Id. at 1060–61. However, according to Professor Andrews, the nerve center is not the only
permissible location of a corporation’s principal place of business under the Goodyear test: “In cases where the
vast bulk of operations are in a single state other than the nerve center, the corporation might be at home in two
states—the nerve center and the operations state.” Id. at 1061.
154. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
155. Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 735. Professor Brilmayer did, however, still believe that general
jurisdiction could be asserted based on a corporation having a significant amount of activities in the forum state.
See id. at 735–36 (“A defendant’s activities in the forum can be the basis for either general or specific
jurisdiction . . . . The type of jurisdiction being asserted sets the quantum of contacts required; . . . general
jurisdiction requires proof of continuous and systematic activities.”).
156. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 680 (quoting Twitchell, Doing Business, supra note 44, at 173)
(stating that Goodyear significantly narrows the scope of general jurisdiction and should be interpreted to end
the notion of “doing business” jurisdiction, which made “general jurisdiction . . . available in any state in which
the defendant ha[d] ‘regular and consistent commercial activities’”); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note
23, at 430 (“[T]he [Goodyear] Court undoubtedly rejected the reasoning of many lower court decisions that
doing some quantum of business with forum residents alone sufficed for the defendant’s amenability to any
cause of action.”); Pielemeier, supra note 80, at 989 (“One fairly clear consequence of [Goodyear] is that
general jurisdiction based on regular sales in the forum is clearly dead.”).
157. See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14.
158. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853.
159. See id. at 2851 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1136).
160. See id. at 2853 (citing von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144–63).
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limited general jurisdiction based on the location of assets—should take
161
the form of specific jurisdiction.
In other words, scholars so respected by the Court as to earn multiple citations in
a mere nine-page opinion interpreted the decision the Court deemed “canonical”
to mean that general jurisdiction is usually only appropriate in a corporation’s
state of incorporation and where its headquarters is located. Based on this myriad
of evidence, it is apparent the Goodyear Court also was referring to those two
locations when it used the phrase “at home.”
2. “Essentially” Creates a Cushion for Exercising General Jurisdiction over
Foreign-Country Corporations
Thus far in the analysis, it is evident that the Court, through the “at home”
language, has retained the longstanding notion that a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction in the states in which it is incorporated and has its principal
162
place of business. Based on the Court’s earlier opinion in Hertz, it is also clear
that a corporation’s sole principal place of business is its nerve center, or locus of
decision-making. What is less clear is what the Goodyear Court meant by
163
“essentially.” Certainly, a purely “state of incorporation and principal place of
business” test would have been clear and easy to articulate. For example, “[a]
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the state in which it is
incorporated and in the state in which it has its principal place of business.” Or,
“a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction in the states in which it is at
home.” Instead, however, the Court coined a new phrase (“essentially at
164
home”), signaling its adoption of something more.
The something more implied by the Court’s use of “essentially” is the
Court’s allowance for a cushion in order to permit a court’s exercise of general
jurisdiction over foreign-country corporations that do not have a principal place
of business located within the United States. Again, this interpretation is fully
explained by the Court’s language and references to precedent. The Court
mandates consideration of the foreign corporation’s “affiliations with the State”
in order to determine whether the corporation is “essentially at home in the forum
165
State.” Using “State,” with a capital “S,” shows that the Court is referring only
to affiliations with the fifty states within the United States and the United States’

161. von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1144.
162. The Court did not explicitly state this rule, perhaps taking it as a given, or perhaps because the
determination of when it is appropriate to exercise general jurisdiction over a domestic corporation with a
principal place of business located within the United States was not before the Court.
163. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
164. Id.
165. Id. (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 317 (1945)) (emphasis added).
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166

Territories, not to affiliations with foreign-country states. However, the test
addresses both “sister-state” (or domestic) foreign corporations and “foreigncountry” foreign corporations, and foreign-country corporations almost always
will have their headquarters located outside of the United States. Therefore,
167
foreign-country corporations rarely will be “at home” within the United States.
Enter Perkins and the term “essentially.” By referring to Perkins as “‘[t]he
textbook case’” of the appropriate exercise of general jurisdiction over a foreign
168
corporation, the Goodyear Court acknowledged that there may be instances in
which a corporation whose principal place of business is abroad nevertheless has
contacts with a forum within the United States that are comparable to having a
principal place of business in the United States—i.e., a temporary or pseudoheadquarters. In those—and only those—instances, the foreign corporation might
169
not be “at home” in the forum state, but it is “essentially at home.”
This is not to say that foreign-country corporations will always have a
170
location within the United States in which they are essentially at home. Nor
166. See Torres v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 113 F.3d 540, 543 (11th Cir. 1997) (“The term ‘State’ with a
capital ‘S’ refers only to the fifty states, Territories, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico, but not to foreign
states, which are referred to with a lowercase ‘s.’”).
167. See Burbank, supra note 80, at 671 (“[A] domestic corporation . . . will always have at least one
‘home’ in the United States, [but] a foreign corporation . . . usually will not.”) (citation omitted). Even domestic
corporations sometimes have their principal place of business located outside of the United States. See, e.g.,
Torres, 113 F.3d at 543 (stating that the defendant corporation was incorporated in Delaware but had its
principal place of business in Peru). However, domestic corporations will be, at the very least, incorporated
within the United States and, therefore, subject to general jurisdiction in at least one place under the proposed
interpretation of “essentially at home.”
168. Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856 (quoting Donahue v. Far E. Air Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1037
(D.C. Cir. 1981)).
169. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 531–32 (“[Justice Ginsburg] doesn’t say that [being “at
home”] is the only circumstance in which general jurisdiction is permitted, but that is the clear implication. In
other words, that level of activity is not simply sufficient, it is necessary.”); Rhodes, Predictability Principle,
supra note 13, at 227 (“[T]he nature of the defendant’s forum operations should indicate activities at least
analogous to the types of in-state activities that define a corporation’s principal place of business.”); Feder,
supra note 15, at 694 (“While the Court’s use of ‘at home’ rather than merely ‘home’—and its softening of the
phrase to ‘essentially at home’ on one occasion—may suggest a degree of wiggle room, the Court’s definition
of the ‘paradigm’ as state of incorporation and principal place of business makes it hard to imagine that the
standard can be stretched to include states where the corporation has only a relatively small presence.”)
(citations omitted); id. at 694 n.117 (“The ‘essentially at home’ phrasing might . . . have been intended to
accommodate the facts of Perkins, in which the forum state was only temporarily the defendant’s principal
place of business.”) (citation omitted); see also Pielemeier, supra note 80, at 991 (“Perhaps for [companies
based in foreign countries], the test should be refined to finding a place where they are ‘at home’ in the United
States.”). One indicator that the Court would have described the defendant in Perkins as “essentially at home”
in Ohio rather than “at home,” is the language it used in applying Perkins to the facts in Goodyear: “Unlike the
defendant in Perkins, whose sole wartime business activity was conducted in Ohio, petitioners are in no sense at
home in North Carolina.” Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857 (emphasis added). Had the Court stated that, unlike the
defendant in Perkins, the Goodyear petitioners were “not at home,” the Court would have implied that the facts
in Perkins were sufficient to render a corporation “at home.” Instead, the Court chose to say that, unlike the
defendant in Perkins, the Goodyear petitioners were “in no sense at home,” thereby implying that the defendant
in Perkins was only in a sense—or “essentially”—at home in Ohio.
170. Cf. Condlin, supra note 23, at 97 (“[T]o support general jurisdiction [in Helicopteros] they would
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should that be the case. As noted by Professor Rhodes, “[a]ll-purpose
adjudicative authority over a foreign[-country] corporation by American courts
should be reserved for rare cases, thereby preventing adjudicative regulation of
171
controversies that have little or no relationship to American interests.” The
Court’s reliance on Helicopteros and, indeed, the result it reached in Goodyear,
support this position. In both cases, the Court denied the exercise of general
jurisdiction over a foreign-country corporation in the only forum within the
172
United States in which it could plausibly be sued. Thus, “[a] plaintiff can
always pursue a defendant in the defendant’s home forum and, in most cases, can
173
proceed where the claim arose”; the fact that those locations might be located
174
outside of the United States may just be tough luck for the plaintiff.
Based on this analysis of the Court’s opinion and application of precedent, it
is evident that the proposed tests discussed in Part II.C. are unsuitable. In direct
contradiction to the Court’s precedent in Hertz, Professor Stein’s, Professor
Hoffheimer’s, and Ms. Peddie’s proposed tests all require consideration of
numerous business activity-related factors, such as sales, employees, and
facilities. And, Professor Rhodes’ interpretation allows for the assertion of
general jurisdiction at multiple administrative offices rather than one principal
“place” of business. Finally, Mr. Feder’s reading overlooks the Court’s express
broadening of the “at home” phrase by use of the word “essentially.” Therefore,

have to show that Helicol had substantial contacts with Texas, and this was nearly impossible to do for a
company that was incorporated, and had its principal place of business, in Colombia, South America.”); Angus,
supra note 23, at 65 (noting that narrowing the exercise of general jurisdiction to the state of incorporation and
principal place of business could result in “foreign defendant[s] . . . escap[ing] liability within the United States
entirely”).
171. Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 430. If the claim arose in the United States, then
presumably there would be a relationship between the controversy and the forum state such that an exercise of
specific jurisdiction would be appropriate. Although, whether a plaintiff will be able to pursue a cause of action
against a foreign-country defendant in the state where the claim arose certainly has been called into question by
the Supreme Court’s strict interpretation of specific jurisdiction in McIntyre.
172. See Louise Weinberg, The Helicopter Case and the Jurisprudence of Jurisdiction, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 913, 916 (1985) (citing Brief for Respondents at 9, 18, Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984)) (“Helicol was amenable to suit in no state if not in Texas; the alternative would
have been a foreign country.”); Angus, supra note 23, at 79–80 (“[I]n deciding that the defendant in
Helicopteros was not subject to general jurisdiction in Texas, the Supreme Court essentially ruled that the
defendant was not subject to any liability in Texas or anywhere else in the United States because Texas was the
only possible forum in which the plaintiffs could bring suit.”); Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 542 (“[T]he
plaintiffs in Goodyear Dunlop were forced to pursue their remedies for the injuries suffered in France in a
French Court.”).
173. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 528.
174. Because of this perceived unfairness to American plaintiffs, some commentators have advocated
for a more lenient standard when it comes to forum residents suing foreign-country defendants. See id. at 541
(citing Linda J. Silberman, Comparative Jurisdiction in the International Context: Will the Proposed Hague
Judgment Convention Be Stalled?, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 319, 340–41 (2003); Twitchell, Doing Business, supra
note 44, at 209–10)) (“Some scholars, notably Linda Silberman and Mary Twitchell, have suggested that
providing general jurisdiction to resident plaintiffs based on a pervasive contacts approach would provide
plaintiffs with an assured domestic remedy . . . .”).
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the lower courts should apply the reasoning proposed in this Article and interpret
“essentially at home” to mean a corporation’s state of incorporation and the one
state in which the corporation’s nerve center (or, pseudo-nerve center in the case
of a foreign-country corporation) is located.
B. Interpreting “Essentially at Home” to Address Important Due Process and
Administrative Goals
As noted by Professor Stein, placing a significant limitation on the exercise
of general jurisdiction—such as the one proposed in this Article—would not only
175
comport with the views held by many commentators in the legal community,
but it would also more closely align the United States with generally accepted
176
international standards. Most importantly, however, use of the Hertz “nerve
center” test to elucidate the “essentially at home” standard in the proposed
manner satisfies the U.S. Constitution’s due process requirements and furthers
177
the judicial system’s goals. First, the proposed explanation promotes fairness
175. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 532 (stating that constraining general jurisdiction “aligns the Court
with many academic commentators . . . who have advocated limiting significantly the operation of general
jurisdiction”) (citations omitted). Some of these views have been held for decades. See, e.g., Allan R. Stein,
Styles of Argument and Interstate Federalism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 TEX. L. REV. 689, 758
(1987) (arguing that general jurisdiction may be exercised only over defendants who have “adopted the forum
as [their] own”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1178–79 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction based on
presence, which often produces unfair results . . . , should disappear. It is, of course, appropriate to preserve
some place where the defendant can be sued on any cause of action. But we submit that only the common arena
of the defendant’s activities should be such a place. . . . [F]or a corporation, it is the corporate headquarters—
presumably both the place of incorporation and the principal place of business, where these differ.”). Others are
newly-expressed interpretations of Goodyear. See, e.g., Feder, supra note 15, at 695 (“Goodyear’s addition of a
new ‘at home’ requirement to the general jurisdiction inquiry . . . significantly, and rightly, undermines the
lower court case law that has accepted (but never justified) doing business in a state as a sufficient basis for
general jurisdiction.”); Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 592 (“[A] fair reading of the opinion leaves little doubt
that circumstances giving rise to general jurisdiction will be unusual.”).
176. Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 532–33 (stating that significantly limiting general jurisdiction is
“consistent with international consensus,” such as Article 2 of the European Regulation on Jurisdiction and the
Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments, as well as the draft Hague Convention on International
Enforcement of Judgments, which permit general jurisdiction only in the state of domicile and prohibit general
jurisdiction based on doing business in the forum, respectively) (citations omitted); see, e.g., Silberman, supra
note 69, at 607–11, 613–14 (discussing the differences between jurisdictional standards in the United States and
abroad); Allan R. Stein, Frontiers of Jurisdiction: From Isolation to Connectedness, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F.
373, 387 (2001) [hereinafter Stein, Frontiers] (“[T]he pervasive contacts approach has been fairly universally
condemned outside of the United States . . . .”); Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 430 (citing
Friedrich K. Juenger, The American Law of General Jurisdiction, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 141 (2001), 162)
(noting that a “confined scope of general jurisdiction approaches international norms, as many other nations
abhor an expansive conception of general jurisdiction”).
177. But see Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 598–99 (citing SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN, supra note 100,
at 34) (stating that “it is questionable whether the principal place of business should be defined the same way
for both subject matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,” and that, while “[t]he [nerve-center] test may . . .
provide one constitutionally appropriate method for determining general jurisdiction[,] . . . . courts may have
good reasons for rejecting the nerve-center test as a particularly inappropriate guide for identifying a
corporation’s principal place of business for purposes of personal jurisdiction”); SHREVE & RAVEN-HANSEN,
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and predictability for the defendant, while incorporating the notion of “fair play
and substantial justice” that has long been a part of personal jurisdiction
jurisprudence. Second, the proposed explanation promotes simplicity and
administrative efficiency, two important attributes of a jurisdictional test.
1. Promoting Fairness, Predictability, and Reasonableness
The ultimate concern in the due process analysis is protection of the
defendant’s liberty interests, or, in other words, ensuring “fairness” to the
178
defendant. Whether it is fair to hale a defendant into court in a given state—to
defend against a claim completely unrelated to the defendant’s activities there—
is primarily determined by examining the defendant’s relationship with that
179
state. The question becomes whether the “defendant [is] sufficiently present

supra note 98, at 34 (citing Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694
(1982)) (“It would be tempting to resolve personal jurisdiction issues by reference to [diversity subject matter
jurisdiction] case law, but this is probably unwise. The due process law of personal jurisdiction and the law of
federal subject matter jurisdiction are grounded on fundamentally different policies. It may be best to apply the
home-state principle of personal jurisdiction to corporations only where the forum is the place of incorporation
or where the activities of the corporation are clearly concentrated.”).
178. See Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 702 (“The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes
and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of
sovereignty, but as a matter of individual liberty.”) (citations omitted); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2800 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“The modern approach to jurisdiction over corporations and
other legal entities, ushered in by International Shoe, gave prime place to reason and fairness.”); Brilmayer et
al., supra note 23, at 766 (citing Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)) (“Fairness, not
simply foreseeability of suit or state interest, is the most important consideration for general jurisdiction.”);
Condlin, supra note 23, at 68 (“[P]arties should not be forced to defend in forums where they will not be treated
fairly. The Due Process Clause demands as much.”). The due process protections also apply to foreign-country
corporate defendants. See Silberman, supra note 69, at 595 (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of
Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 & n.*, 114–15 (1987)) (“One fundamental question in the United States is whether a
foreign defendant can even invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause. The Supreme Court has answered
that question ‘yes,’ at least as regards private defendants.”). But see John N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdiction in a
Global World: A Comment on the Supreme Court’s Recent Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro,
90 WASH. U. L. REV. ___, ___ (forthcoming 2013) (“Although the Court has applied the same jurisdictional
rules to non-resident foreign nationals as it does to U.S. citizens, and no parties have argued otherwise, it is time
for the Court to apply its due process precedent to issues of personal jurisdiction and rule that non-citizens lack
the constitutional protections available to citizens.”); id. at ___ (“[T]he due process clause provides absolutely
no protection to defendants like the ones in Goodyear and Nicastro.”).
179. See supra notes 27–29 and accompanying text; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977)
(“[T]he relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the litigation, rather than the mutually exclusive
sovereignty of the States on which the rules of Pennoyer rest, [are] the central concern of the inquiry into
personal jurisdiction.”); Condlin, supra note 23, at 66 (“[T]he defining feature of the doctrine [of general
jurisdiction is] that a party can be sued for anything without the plaintiff having to show a relationship between
the claim and the forum. Only the defendant’s relationship with the forum is relevant. This much is
uncontroversial.”) (citations omitted); Silberman, supra note 69, at 607 (“In the United States, it is the
affiliation between the defendant and the forum that is critical, and this is true for the interstate as well as the
transnational case. Whether the values reflected are those about sovereignty and consent to authority or the
sense of a fundamental principle of what is fair, remains clouded after the two recent Supreme Court
decisions.”).
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that it is reasonable to expect that [the defendant] will be treated fairly by local
180
courts and juries.”
The answer to that question is “yes” under the interpretation of “essentially at
home” proposed in this Article. Certainly, a defendant’s relationship with its state
181
of incorporation is strong enough to support the exercise of general jurisdiction.
It is by virtue of that state’s laws that the corporation exists, and the corporation
182
183
is perpetually present there. Moreover, personal jurisdiction can be waived ;
therefore, the corporation’s decision to incorporate in a given state should be
184
seen as voluntary consent to general jurisdiction in that forum. Thus, it can
hardly be deemed unfair to a corporation to hale it into court in its state of
incorporation.
Likewise, it is fair to hale the corporation into court in the state where its
headquarters (or something akin to a corporate headquarters) is located. After all,
the corporation has chosen to concentrate the direction, control, and coordination
185
of its activities and policies in that state. Unlike a state in which the corporation
merely does business, the state housing its corporate headquarters is the location
186
from which the corporation makes all of its major corporate-life decisions.

180. Condlin, supra note 23, at 68 (“Since general jurisdiction presupposes the lack of a relationship
between the forum and the plaintiff’s claim, it follows that it should be available only in states where defendants
are sufficiently present that it is reasonable to expect that they will be treated fairly by local courts and juries.”);
see Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 543 (discussing the issues as whether “others [would] perceive [the
defendant] as a member of their community” such that the defendant “will be treated as fairly [t]here as
anywhere else.”).
181. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733–34 (discussing reasons why it is proper to exercise
general jurisdiction over a corporation in its state of incorporation); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at
1141 (“The community that chartered the corporation . . . occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of the
community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence” and can, therefore, exercise general
jurisdiction over the corporation.). But see Twitchell, Myth, supra note 20, at 669–70 (“Although the fact of
incorporation under state law gives the forum state a valid interest in applying its own laws to any suit involving
the internal affairs of the corporation, a strong argument can be made that the automatic exercise of ‘pure’
general jurisdiction over a domestic corporation is inappropriate when so many corporations lack any other
significant ties with their state of incorporation.”) (citations omitted).
182. See Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733 (noting that a corporation “cannot ever be absent from
the state of incorporation”).
183. Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd., 456 U.S. at 703.
184. See Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 547 (“[A] defendant can volitionally submit to the authority of
a state . . . [, so] it is appropriate to subject a defendant to general jurisdiction in its state (or states) of
incorporation . . . . [because its] choice of incorporation in a particular state is entirely voluntary and involves
continuing responsibility to and regulatory governance by the state.”); Brilmayer et al., supra note 23, at 733
(“In some respects, the decision to incorporate in a particular state provides a more powerful basis for
adjudicatory jurisdiction than does domicile [for an individual]. . . . [T]he corporation intentionally chooses to
create a relationship with the state of incorporation, presumably to obtain the benefits of that state’s substantive
and procedural laws. Such a choice creates a unique relationship that justifies general jurisdiction over the
corporation.”).
185. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1192 (2010) (stating that a place will only qualify as a
“headquarters” for purposes of the principal place of business analysis if it “is the actual center of direction,
control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the corporation holds its board meetings.”).
186. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 671–72 (“A defendant engaging in continuous and
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Consequently, the corporation is acting like a local individual resident in every
sense and will be treated as fairly in that state as it would be treated in any other
187
state. The Court has already indicated its approval of this approach in Hertz. As
discussed above, in narrowing the availability of diversity jurisdiction, Congress
was similarly trying to determine in which state’s courts a corporate defendant
188
would be least likely to suffer from local prejudice. Congress ultimately
determined that state is wherever the entity’s principal place of business is
189
located. In Hertz, the Supreme Court further defined that state as wherever the
190
entity’s nerve center is located.
Closely related to the due process goal of fairness is predictability. While the
primary concern here is that the defendant be able to predict where it can be
191
subject to suit, it is also important that a plaintiff be able to accurately predict
192
where a defendant can be forced to litigate. Limiting the “essentially at home”
substantial economic activity within a forum shares some traits with insiders: it pays taxes, is subject to
regulation, benefits from participation in the local economy, and has some power to influence local political
processes. But unlike citizens or corporations based within the forum, it is often not ‘local’ in its own eyes or in
the eyes of the community because its major economic ties are outside the boundaries of the state and it has
strong ties to at least one other sovereign. Thus, it is not an ‘insider’—’one of us’—to the same degree as a
purely local corporation or business.”) (citations omitted); Stein, Frontiers, supra note 176, at 382–83 (“While
we have some sense that our ‘home’ state—our ‘king’—may have authority over us regardless of where we
have acted, we do not owe the same universal allegiance to other states that we merely visit—even those we
visit frequently or in which we may wield significant political influence. . . . I am not prepared to say that one
can never form a ‘citizen-like’ relationship with multiple sovereigns, but mere ‘continuous and systematic
activity’ does not begin to capture this citizen-like relationship.”).
187. See Rhodes, Nineteenth Century, supra note 23, at 428–29 (“If a corporation is conducting core
executive and administrative functions within a state, such as controlling its operations, billing its customers,
accounting for its financial status, managing its employees, and establishing its pricing structure, it is acting in a
similar manner to a local business in the state.”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1141 (“The
community . . . in which [a corporation] has its head office occupies a position somewhat analogous to that of
the community of a natural person’s domicile and habitual residence.”). Contra Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at
599 n.279 (“The location of executive offices has no necessary relationship to corporate activity that generates
business or that constitutes the contacts and presence traditionally required for general jurisdiction.”); Stein,
Meaning, supra note 7, at 546 (“[T]here is no need . . . to privilege the locus of corporate decision-making [in
determining where corporations are subject to general jurisdiction]. . . . It is particularly important for courts to
take into consideration how invested a defendant is in the forum state, and how apparent that investment is to
the community. Accordingly, the number of employees should count, as well as other indicia of presence, such
as manufacturing facilities or corporate offices.”) (citations omitted).
188. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text (discussing the fairness concerns inherent in a
diversity subject matter jurisdiction analysis in terms of local bias); Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1192 (“[T]he general
purpose of diversity jurisdiction . . . [is] to find the State where a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state
prejudice when it is sued in local court.”); supra notes 27–28, 36 and accompanying text (discussing the
fairness concerns inherent in a personal jurisdiction analysis in terms of minimum contacts with the forum).
189. See supra notes 96–104 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 130–133 and accompanying text.
191. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (“The Due Process Clause, by ensuring the ‘orderly administration of
the laws,’ gives a degree of predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their
primary conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render them liable to
suit.”).
192. Rhodes, Predictability Principle, supra note 13, at 137 (citing World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S.
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test to mean a corporation’s state of incorporation and the one state in which the
193
corporation has its (pseudo-) headquarters best accommodates both needs. A
corporation clearly will know from which state it obtained its corporate charter,
and it is fairly easy for an adversary to determine a potential corporate
194
defendant’s state of incorporation. While determining in which state a court
would deem a corporation’s principal place of business to be located may not
always be as straightforward, the “nerve center” test will at least lead in “a single
direction, towards the center of overall direction,” rather than requiring the
parties to weigh various categories of contacts (like assets, sales, and property) in
195
order to render a guess. Thus, in today’s marketplace, where “many major
business entities do substantially systematic and continuous business in many if
196
not every state,” defining the principal place of business as the nerve center
provides the most predictable results.

at 291–92) (“Predictability insures both that nonresidents will be able to structure their transactions to avoid the
sovereign jurisdictional prerogative of a foreign state and that litigants will have some guidance as to when a
jurisdictional challenge may be appropriate.”); von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137 (“[J]ustice
requires a certain and predictable place where a person can be reached by those having claims against him.”).
193. See Feder, supra note 15, at 693 (quoting von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 14, at 1137)
(“Doing business jurisdiction also falls short when viewed in light of another core justification for general
jurisdiction: the notion that ‘justice requires a certain and predictable place where a person can be reached by
those having claims against him.’ So long as the defendant’s state of incorporation and/or its principal place of
business remain available, this purpose is satisfied, and provides no reason to extend jurisdiction to multiple
other locations.”). Limiting the general jurisdiction test in this manner also prevents forum-shopping by
plaintiffs. For example, a forum state will almost always apply its own statute of limitations to a claim, no
matter where the claim arose. E.g., Shannon Mcghee Hernandez, Comment, Civil Procedure—Metropolitan
Life Insurance Co. v. Robertson-Ceco Corp.: The Reasonableness Inquiry in the Context of General
Jurisdiction, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 723, 740 (1997) (citing Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 722–23
(1988)). And, some forums are “magnets for litigation . . . because of their tendency to render large jury
awards.” Stein, Meaning, supra note 7, at 540–41. Thus, when corporations are subject to general jurisdiction in
numerous locations, plaintiffs are able to forum shop for, among other things, the most favorable law and the
most sympathetic juries. See, e.g., Stein, Frontiers, supra note 176, at 384–85 (discussing the effects of forum
shopping); Hernandez, supra, at 739–40 (“Plaintiffs are often motivated to forum shop not because they seek
the most convenient forum for themselves—or the least convenient one for the defendant—but rather because
they want to take advantage of the law of a particular forum.”); Lee Scott Taylor, Registration Statutes,
Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1163, 1194 (2003) (“Statutes of
limitations . . . are not the only problem associated with forum shopping. There are significant intangible
considerations: perceived jury predispositions, judicial personalities, and the political responsiveness of state
judiciaries, among others.”).
194. See Harry C. Sigman, Improvements (?) to the UCC Article 9 Filing System, 46 GONZ. L. REV. 457,
482 (2010–2011) (“[S]tates maintain filed corporate charters as a public record . . . .”).
195. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1194 (2010); see Sarah R. Cebik, “A Riddle Wrapped in a
Mystery Inside an Enigma”: General Personal Jurisdiction and Notions of Sovereignty, 1998 ANN. SURV. AM.
L. 1, 11–12 (“Without any predictability in the courts’ behavior, it is impossible for a defendant to structure
conduct so as to avoid or subject itself to general jurisdiction. . . . Such unpredictability not only allows judges
to act in a relatively arbitrary manner but also raises the costs of litigation since the attorneys in any matter are
less likely to estimate properly which states will have jurisdiction over the defendant. This significantly lessens
the value of the doctrine of personal jurisdiction—particularly general personal jurisdiction.”).
196. Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 759.
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Finally, the “fair play and substantial justice” component of the due process
analysis, as articulated in International Shoe, has been interpreted by the Court to
embody a “reasonableness” inquiry that consists of five factors: (1) “the burden
on the defendant,” (2) “the interests of the forum State,” (3) “the plaintiff’s
interest in obtaining relief,” (4) “‘the interstate judicial system’s interest in
obtaining the most efficient resolution of controversies,’” and (5) “‘the shared
interest of the several States in furthering fundamental substantive social
197
policies.’” While some commentators debate whether these factors are
applicable in the general jurisdiction analysis (or whether they are intended to
198
apply only in the specific jurisdiction context), most agree that they should
199
be.
The Court did not explicitly address these factors in Goodyear; however, its
“essentially at home” test, when viewed in light of the Court’s language and
precedent as discussed in this Article, is inherently reasonable (and, therefore,
200
needed no further explanation from the Court). First, there can be no question
that the burden on the corporate defendant of litigating in the state where it has
its corporate headquarters would be minimal. After all, it likely would have local
attorneys on call who are familiar with its business, and it would have key
201
executives and documents readily available. While the burden of litigating in

197. Asahi Metal Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480 U.S. 102, 113 (1987) (quoting WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980)); see, e.g., Walter W. Heiser, Toward
Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of General Jurisdiction, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1035, 1040–41 (2004)
(discussing the genesis of the “reasonableness” factors); Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note
23, at 899 (same); Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 752–53 (same).
198. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 588–89 & n.229 (stating that “[i]t was never entirely clear”
whether the reasonableness factors should be considered in the general jurisdiction analysis); Rhodes,
Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 899 (“[T]he Supreme Court did not specifically resolve
whether these factors also apply to assertions of general jurisdiction rather than the specific jurisdiction that was
at issue in Asahi and its prior decisions adopting these criteria.”); Silberman, supra note 69, at 594–95 (“[T]here
seems to be some doubt as to whether the reasonableness prong applies in cases of general jurisdiction . . . .”);
Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 758 (noting that none of the Court’s general jurisdiction opinions address
the reasonableness factors).
199. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1042 (citing George, supra note 32, at 1129–41) (“[T]here is nothing
in the Supreme Court’s discussions of these factors to indicate they apply only in specific jurisdiction cases.
Indeed, . . . concerns about whether the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable and fair should actually be
heightened in general jurisdiction cases.”); Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, supra note 23, at 899–901
(stating that the reasonableness factors should be part of the general jurisdiction analysis); Silberman, supra
note 69, at 595 (“[G]eneral jurisdiction may present the strongest case for . . . invocation [of the reasonableness
factors].”); cf. Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 758 (stating that lower courts have applied the
reasonableness factors in general jurisdiction cases) (citations omitted). But see Hernandez, supra note 193, at
741 (arguing that the states’ interests in resolving a dispute are inherently weak in the general jurisdiction
context and should not play any role in the analysis).
200. Similarly, it has been argued that Justice Ginsburg invoked, without explicitly naming, the
reasonableness factors in her McIntyre dissent. See Stravitz, Sayonara, supra note 31, at 757.
201. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1043 (“The inquiries relevant here include the location of potential
witnesses, documents, and records; [and] whether the defendant has a subsidiary or agent, maintains an office or
other physical presence, in the forum . . . .”).
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the state of incorporation may be greater for an entity that does no business there,
modern transportation and communication abilities greatly lessen the
202
inconvenience. Second, the state of incorporation and the state in which the
corporation’s nerve center is located are the corporation’s “home” states, and
states have a great interest in determining the rights and obligations of their
203
citizens. Third, while the plaintiff’s interest in “obtaining convenient and
204
effective relief” will depend in large part upon who the plaintiff is, having a
predictable location in which a defendant may be subject to suit on any claim
205
will, at the very least, reduce the cost and uncertainty inherent in litigation.
Fourth, at least some efficiency in litigation will be achieved by virtue of suing a
defendant in its home forum because the defendant will not contest jurisdiction
206
through time-consuming pre-trial motion practice. And, fifth, subjecting a
foreign-country corporation to general jurisdiction in the United States only when
the corporation has essentially made itself at home in a particular state furthers
207
foreign relations policies.
The interpretation of “essentially at home” proposed in this Article satisfies
due process requirements in ways the proposed tests discussed in Part II.C.
cannot. For example, while it may seem fair in some instances to hale a
defendant into court in a state in which it does a substantial amount of business,
utilizing a corporate operations-related factor test (like the tests proposed by
Professor Stein, Professor Hoffheimer, and Ms. Peddie) inhibits the goals of
predictability and reasonableness inherent in the due process analysis. Leaving
open the possibility that courts in an indefinite number of states may be able to
assert general jurisdiction over a corporation (as suggested by Professor Rhodes)
similarly yields unpredictability. And, foreclosing the possibility of being able to
sue a foreign-country defendant somewhere in the United States (which would be

202. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 590 (“Requiring continuous and systematic contacts comparable
to the defendants’ legal home . . . protects corporate defendants from the burden of litigating in seriously
inconvenient places.”); Wasserman, supra note 1, at 349 (“[M]odern technology, communications, travel, and
commerce make it easier for people and entities to reach into and engage in foreign forums through their
conduct and also to litigate there . . . .”) (citations omitted).
203. See Hoffheimer, supra note 20, at 590 (“Requiring continuing and systematic contacts comparable
to the defendants’ legal home assures that such states will have real interests in providing forums . . . .”).
204. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1045 (“The relevant inquiries here may include whether the plaintiff
is a resident or domiciliary of the forum state, where the plaintiff suffered injury, whether the forum state is
more convenient for witnesses or other evidence than some other available forum, whether the plaintiff has a
financial or physical ability to litigate elsewhere, whether all the parties to the dispute can be joined in the
chosen forum, and whether the plaintiff will be able to enforce a judgment obtained from the forum.”).
205. See infra Part IV.B.2.
206. Id.
207. See Heiser, supra note 197, at 1048 (quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., 480
U.S. 102, 115 (1987)) (stating that this factor requires “consideration of the procedural and substantive policies
of other nations whose interests are affected by the assertion of jurisdiction by a court in the United States” and
of “‘the Federal Government’s interest in its foreign relations policies.’”).
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a possibility under Mr. Feder’s reading) may, in some instances, be contrary to
the notion of “fair play and substantial justice.”
2. Promoting Simplicity and Administrative Efficiency
While not of as prime importance as fairness and predictability, simplicity
and administrative efficiency are very favorable attributes of a jurisdictional
208
209
test. Personal jurisdiction tends to be a hotly contested issue in litigation,
eating up not only the parties’ time and money, but also valuable judicial
210
resources. The use of complex jurisdictional tests only compounds the problem.
On the other hand, using a simple test to “limit the scope of general jurisdiction
to a set of clearly defined circumstances [will] provide certainty and
211
administrative efficiency.”
The interpretation of the “essentially at home” test articulated in this Article
is both simple and administratively efficient; the Court already explained as
much in Hertz. In that case, the Court rejected the “corporate activities” and
“total activity” tests used by some lower courts to determine a corporation’s
principal place of business because the tests were too complicated and required
212
consideration of too many factors. Instead, the Court adopted the “nerve
center” test because it is “[comparatively] simple to apply” and will not consume
213
judicial resources. Similarly, the “essentially at home” tests based on revenue,
employee count, the location of manufacturing facilities, and “a host of plus
factors, far too lengthy to list” (as proposed by Professor Stein, Professor
214
Hoffheimer, and Ms. Peddie) involve contemplation of multiple factors and
215
would invite too much time-consuming and unnecessary litigation. Thus, those
tests should be disregarded in favor of a “state of incorporation and (pseudo-)
216
nerve center” test. The state of incorporation will be readily apparent, so
208. See supra notes 125–129 and accompanying text; World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U.S. 286, 294 (1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)) (“[T]he Due Process
Clause ensures not only fairness, but also the ‘orderly administration of the laws . . . .’”).
209. See Russell J. Weintraub, A Map Out of the Personal Jurisdiction Labyrinth, 28 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 531, 531 (1995) (“[T]he threshold determination of personal jurisdiction has become one of the most
litigated issues in state and federal courts.”).
210. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181, 1193 (2010) (“[A]dministrative simplicity is a major
virtue in a jurisdictional statute. Complex jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money as the
parties litigate, not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to decide those claims. . . .
Judicial resources too are at stake.”).
211. Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 681.
212. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194.
213. Id. at 1193.
214. See supra Part II.C.
215. Peddie, supra note 7, at 726; see supra notes 70–78 and accompanying text.
216. See Twitchell, Myth, supra note 23, at 676 (stating that limiting general jurisdiction “can provide
plaintiffs with a forum whose power over a defendant is so undisputed that the parties and the judiciary will not
need to expend significant resources in the preliminary jurisdictional inquiry.”).
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making that determination should require extremely minimal use of party or
court resources. The same will be true for determining the location of a
corporation’s nerve center in the vast majority of cases where a corporation has
only one identifiable headquarters. It is true that there will be “hard cases” in
which it may be difficult to determine, for example, which of a corporation’s
217
offices is its “main” office. However, outliers would occur under any test, and
such limited challenges do not outweigh the vast benefits provided by the “nerve
center” approach.
V. CONCLUSION
In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, the U.S. Supreme
Court announced a new and somewhat vague test for determining in which states
a corporation can be subject to general personal jurisdiction: those states in which
218
it is “essentially at home.” In comparison to the Court’s notorious decision in
Goodyear’s companion case, J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, the
nebulous “essentially at home” standard received minimal attention. However,
Goodyear marked the first time in nearly three decades that the Court addressed
the issue of general jurisdiction, so it seems unlikely that it will do so again in the
near future. Therefore, it is imperative that the lower courts, litigators, and
potential litigants know what that test means.
This Article proposes the following interpretation of Goodyear: A
corporation is “at home” only in its state of incorporation and in the one state
where its principal place of business, or nerve center, is located. In the event the
corporation’s headquarters is located outside of the United States, it is
“essentially at home” in the one state, if any, in which it has administrative and
executive contacts comparable to those found at a corporate headquarters (i.e., a
pseudo-nerve center). Importantly, this interpretation gives meaning to the
Court’s express language, which demonstrates its intent to allow for the exercise
of general jurisdiction over a corporation where it is domiciled—i.e., in its state
of incorporation and the state in which it has its principal place of business. It
also properly reconciles Goodyear with the Court’s earlier opinion in Hertz Corp.
v. Friend, in which the Court determined that a corporation’s principal place of
business for purposes of diversity subject matter jurisdiction is located at its
nerve center. In both instances, the Court was trying to determine in which state a
corporation has such significant contacts that it can be forced to litigate there
without being subject to local prejudice. Furthermore, this interpretation explains

217. Hertz, 130 S. Ct. at 1194. The Hertz Court noted that “there will be hard cases” under the “nerve
center” test, such as the corporation that divides its supervisory functions among multiple locations, but that at
least “[c]ourts do not have to try to weigh corporate functions, assets, or revenues different in kind, one from the
other.” Id.
218. 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
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the Court’s use of such a vague standard by allowing for the exercise of general
jurisdiction over a corporation that is not domiciled in the United States, but that
does have contacts with a particular state that are comparable to having a
principal place of business there. Finally, in addition to explaining the Court’s
express language, interpreting “essentially at home” as proposed in this Article
will not only promote fairness and predictability for the defendant—central
concerns when exercising personal jurisdiction and applying the Due Process
Clause—but it also will promote simplicity and administrative efficiency.
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